Islam is projected to overtake Christianity as the world's largest religion by 2035, while the Hindu share of the global population is set to decline even as total Hindu numbers keep rising. That headline sounds dramatic, and honestly, it grabs attention fast. Yet the real story behind the new Pew Research Center projections isn't mass religious conversion or sudden spiritual awakening. It comes down to basic population math.
Demographers call it natural population change. Births minus deaths. When you look closely at those numbers, a lot of popular assumptions fall apart. People love blaming or crediting immigration, proselytizing, or cultural shifts for sweeping demographic changes. In reality, age structures and fertility rates do almost all the heavy lifting here.
By 2035, Pew projects roughly 2.57 billion Muslims and 2.52 billion Christians worldwide. That puts Islam ahead by a narrow margin after centuries of Christianity holding the top spot. Looking out to 2070, Muslims could make up about 36% of the world's population—more than 3.6 billion people—compared with roughly 29% for Christians, sitting just under 3 billion. Meanwhile, Hindus are expected to grow in absolute headcount but slip as a percentage of humanity overall.
Why Fertility and Youth Shape the Numbers
If you've ever studied population pyramids, you know that momentum in demographics takes decades to turn. Even if birth rates fall tomorrow, a huge wave of young people entering their twenties today will still shape global births for years to come.
Pew's data shows that Muslim women had an average total fertility rate of 3.1 children per woman between 2020 and 2025. Christian women averaged 2.5 children over the same span. All other groups combined averaged 1.6—well below the roughly 2.1 children per woman needed to replace a generation in places with low child mortality.
Age makes the gap even wider. As of 2020, the median age for Muslims globally was 24. For Hindus, it was 29, and for Christians, 31, while non-Muslims overall had a median age of 33. When a massive share of a population hasn't yet finished its childbearing years, birth totals climb fast even when per-woman fertility starts edging downward.
What Happens to the Hindu Share of the World
A common mistake people make when reading headlines about a declining share is assuming a shrinking headcount. Those two things aren't the same. Hindus are projected to keep growing in total numbers—especially in India, which still drives the biggest absolute increase in Hindu population—even as their share of the global total dips.
Why does the share drop if total numbers rise? Because global population growth isn't spread evenly across every faith or region. Pew estimates a global fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman for Hindus during 2020 to 2025, slightly below replacement level. When faster-growing populations expand more rapidly over fifty years, any group growing more slowly naturally accounts for a smaller slice of the total pie.
Outside South Asia, patterns look different again. Hindu populations are projected to grow at faster rates in certain countries outside India, including the United States, while Nepal and India remain the only two Hindu-majority nations. Still, global share is a relative metric, and relative shares move whenever growth rates diverge.
Conversions Are Not Driving This Shift
Let's clear up a big myth right away. If you think Islam is overtaking Christianity because tens of millions of people are switching faiths back and forth, the numbers don't back that up. Pew notes that religious switching between Muslims and Christians roughly evens out over the projection window—about 9.2 million Muslims projected to become Christian versus roughly 9 million Christians expected to become Muslim between 2020 and 2070.
Conversion isn't trivial in local communities or personal lives. At the global scale of billions of people, though, birth rates and mortality dwarf switching rates. Anyone trying to read geopolitics or culture through a "conversion war" lens is looking at the wrong lever.
Sub-Saharan Africa and Shifting Maps
Geography is the other half of this equation. Most of the world's population growth over the coming decades is concentrated in Africa, particularly south of the Sahara. That region is young, and its population expansion is reshaping both major faiths.
By 2070, more than half of the world's Christians are projected to live in sub-Saharan Africa. Even more striking for people used to older maps, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is projected to surpass the United States as the country with the largest Christian population. Meanwhile, the United States is projected to see its Christian headcount fall from 217 million in 2020 to 174 million by 2070 and will no longer have a Christian majority.
Europe tells a very different story. With an aging population and lower fertility, Europe's overall population is projected to shrink, and its Christian population is expected to drop sharply in headcount while Muslims grow as a share of the continent's population from 6% in 2020 to 13% by 2070. At the same time, religiously unaffiliated Europeans are projected to rise from about a quarter to roughly a third of the region.
In Asia and the Pacific, Muslims are projected to surpass religiously unaffiliated people as the largest group by 2070, with Hindus becoming the second-largest group. Pakistan is projected to hold the largest Muslim population globally by 2070, followed by India, Nigeria, and Indonesia.
What About "Nones," Buddhists, and Jews
Quick news summaries often skip the smaller or more complex categories, which leaves readers guessing. Here's how the rest of the picture looks in Pew's 2020–2070 projections:
- Religiously unaffiliated ("nones"): Globally, their share of the world's population is projected to fall from 24% in 2020 to 17% by 2070. That sounds surprising until you factor in China, where a large share of unaffiliated people live and where overall population decline pulls down the global share. Outside China, the number of unaffiliated people is still projected to grow by more than 180 million by 2070, with lowest overall fertility among unaffiliated women at 1.3 children per woman in the 2020–2025 window.
- Buddhists: Projected to decline both in total headcount and as a share of the world's population, dropping below 2% of people globally by 2070. Low fertility (1.6 children per woman) and aging populations in places like China, Japan, and Thailand drive this trend.
- Jews: Projected to grow in absolute numbers from roughly 15 million in 2020 to nearly 18 million by 2070, yet dip slightly as a share of the global total from 0.19% to 0.17%. Geographic concentration is also shifting sharply, with 62% of the world's Jews projected to live in Israel by 2070, up from 46% in 2020.
Where Projections Can Go Wrong
I've followed demographic forecasts long enough to respect their math while never treating them like destiny. Projections are conditional stories built on current assumptions—fertility trajectories, mortality improvements, migration flows, and historical switching patterns.
Wars, economic shocks, pandemics, shifts in education and women's workforce participation, and climate pressures can all bend fertility or migration curves faster than a linear model expects. Pew itself stresses that these models aren't prophecies of every shock that might hit the world between now and 2070. Fertility rates are already projected to converge somewhat over time—with Muslim fertility projected around 2.2 children per woman by 2065–2070—which shows how quickly assumptions can evolve over half a century.
Practical Steps If You Use Demographic Data
Whether you work in policy, business expansion, education, media, or community planning, don't treat a headline milestone like "largest religion by 2035" as a complete strategy. Do three things instead:
- Separate headcount from share and age structure. A growing absolute population with a younger median age creates very different consumer, school, and labor needs than a shrinking population—even when percentage shares move slowly.
- Drill down to country and city level. Global averages blur huge local differences. Planning for sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, North America, or Western Europe requires country-specific age and fertility data, not one-size-fits-all global numbers.
- Update assumptions whenever fresh census or survey data lands. Treat 2035 and 2070 figures as moving baselines, and cross-check demographic forecasts against real-world economic and social shifts on the ground.